Tuesday, October 11, 2011

Decision

I like to think that I do what I do because it makes sense. I don’t know how that sense is made, or what makes it sense, but if it makes sense, then it should be a good idea. Now, having read Lehrer, I wonder why things make sense, who or what determines what is sense, and whether I should trust that entity that defines sense. It seems to me that to be moral is logical. I feel bad when I do amoral things, so it makes sense to do moral things so I won’t feel bad. That makes sense, but I don’t like that rational. Really, it seems that one should be moral because it is right to be moral, not because it prevents unpleasant feelings. One should be moral because it will prevent others from feeling bad. Luckily, whether I establish rational reasoning to justify my moral actions or not, according to Lehrer, I cannot escape acting morally for the sake of others. “At its core, moral decision-making is about sympathy. We abhor violence because we know violence hurts. We treat others fairly because we know what it feels like to be treated unfairly. We reject suffering because we can imagine what it’s like to suffer” (Lehrer, 180). I might think that I act morally because it protects me from disagreeable feelings, but, if I was not basing my morals on a thorough sympathy for others, I would not be able to act morally at all. “We are designed to feel one another’s pain so that we’re extremely distressed when we hurt others and commit moral transgressions” (Lehrer, 194). In order to avoid feeling the distress of others’ pain, I must act morally. I cannot act morally without a consciousness of others’ distress.

Lehrer also explains that moral actions are based on the decision-making abilities of the brain. “Morality can be a squishy, vague concept, and yet, at its simples level, it’s nothing but a series of choices about how we treat people” (Lehrer, 169). The brain makes decisions based on what will create favorable reactions within, and moral actions allow the brain to feel good, because others feel good. I am rather glad that moral action on the behalf of others is unavoidable. For a long while, it seemed logical to me that one would always act in one’s own self-interest. This was an unpleasant view of humanity, but it made sense. Even when someone contributed ‘selflessly’ to charity, they received pleasure from that activity, and were therefore acting in their own interest. It is good to know that moral decisions are inevitably based on the decisions’ effect on others, whether people receive positive feelings from acting morally or not.

In regard to other types of decision-making (outside of personal moral decisions directly affecting others), the situations that intrigued me most were those concerning politics, perhaps because my major involves a great amount of political science (or because I have a vindictive desire to know how some people can disregard information clearly contradictory to their opinions). I particularly enjoyed Lehrer’s explanation for the inventive rational strongly opinioned voters are able to apply to incoming information. “…Once the subjects had arrived at favorable interpretations of the evidence, … they activated the internal reward circuits in their brains and experienced a rush of pleasurable emotion. Self-delusion, in other words, felt really good” (Lehrer, 205). I often witness situations in which someone seems to me to be particularly impermeable, impervious to information that obviously discredits the opinion they are arguing, and wonder how they can possibly pay no attention to opposing logic. This seems to occur, not only in politically opinionated adults, but teenaged boys, like my little brother, and those at MCCS (ok, teenaged girls too…). Many times, I’ve observed that once a student (or my brother) has expressed an opinion, they seem to feel obligated to defend that opinion, no matter how inaccurate it might be. I had previously thought that this insistence was based on a desire to prevent a loss of respect, but self-delusion, whether in teenagers or adults, makes far more sense if the deluded have conditioned their brain to reward them for making all incoming information fit their predetermined decisions.

In order to prevent the same activity in my brain, I look to Lehrer’s closing reference, Alfred P. Sloan, who said, “‘I take it we are all in complete agreement on the decision here… Then I propose we postpone further discussion of this matter until our next meeting to give ourselves time to develop disagreement…” (Lehrer, 218). I can only hope that the through same policy I might avoid self-delusional logic. I believe I shall take up the practice of the GM chairman, and make a point to generate opposing views when faced with big decisions in the future.

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