In Suk Cha:
"One of the reasons why modern humanity cannot claim vestiges of primordial fear of difference as viable cause for violence and conflict is that we humans share too much in common with each other in our societies. It is difficult to find any group or society that has not entered into some sort of cultural exchange with another." (5)
In discussing the possessing cultural objects, Appiah brings up this point in the title of the chapter, “Whose Culture is It, Anyways?” and uses multiple examples of both difficulties in defining national ownership as well as the idea of “cultural authenticity.” For example, the looted Aban treasure “was, in fact, splendidly cosmopolitan” gathered over centuries of looting done by Kamasi in the same way the British museum contains an incredible cross section of works from colonization and seizures, as well as, it should be noted, purchases and loan agreements (133). Further, Appiah takes the idea of no single ownership to connect all human beings together as preserving a diverse human cultural record assessable to all, owned by none, and cared for by citizens and organizations which understand the possession as a responsibility to others rather than a right to exclusive access. “Framing the problem that way-as an issue for all mankind-should make it plain that it is the value of cultural property to people and not to peoples that matters” thus making it so that “if UNESCO has spent as much effort to make it possible for great art to get into Mali as it has done to stop great art from getting out, it would have been serving better the interests of Malians” by providing a cosmopolitan aesthetic experience (121,124). The difficulty “to find any group or society that has not entered into some sort of cultural exchange with another” becomes more of an impossibility. Further, Appiah argues that our differences should not cause fear but rather further appreciation, “connection not through identity but despite difference” (135). Despite our differences, the deep connections we feel are not through defined as ours, but the truth that can come by observing foreign art to reflect some aspect of ourselves. Thus, our identity is no longer about nation, people, or cultural products; it is about being human. If humanity is our identity, there is no need to fear any differences since at the core we share the same identity, that of our species which does stretch all cultural boundaries and origins further than any nation, invasion, or ancestral heritage.
In Suk Cha:
Can there be an ethics for peace that cuts across cultures? I stand with those who contend that we are already moving toward such an ethics and it is not an invisible hand that moves us, it is individual and collective agency. We have obligations though, as we never need have if we choose to believe that we are not responsible for decisions we make and the actions we take. Our obligations include examining the nature of societies in terms of their differences and similarities and in terms of how they change upon interaction. (6)
“Cosmopolitans think that there are many values worth living by and that you cannot live by all of them. So we hope and expect that difference people and different societies will embody different values. (But they have to be values worth living by.)” (145).
The most important part of this statement is the clarification placed in the parenthesis. If we are to have ethics across cultures, we must work to determine that there are right and wrong values. However, all the right values, and luckily in the same strain, all the wrong values, cannot be included in every person since as stated in the above quote. Having many people each of whom can have unique values adds incredibly to the beauty, diversity, and complexity of the human experience. Further adding to the problem is that humans a fallible, “our knowledge is imperfect, provisional, subject to revision in the face of new evidence” (144). If people learn to live as a fallible and pluralistic species, how can we take contentment and change it into a platform to understand our obligations to other societies, though other societies often have blurry borders. Further, each individual is responsible, not passive, in the process of overall judgments and actions of people as well we their individual actions, as Appiah, Friere, and Cha have emphasized. Not only can peace are harmony be solely found through incorporating the world outside of oneself, a truly ethical lifestyle and cosmopolitan can see differences but not disconnection in people.
In Suk Cha:
That human nature is conflicted and oppositional, there can be no doubt. That is surely one thing that every society has discovered, just as every society discovers that whatever is decent, beautiful and just exists only because of societal living. Civil union can bring out the best and likely the worst in human beings, but without civil union, there is no humanity. (10)
As a species, which is how both Cha and Appiah advocate seeing as the broadest stroke of connection, we are socially dependent. However, as a living organism with a competition for resources, reproductive success, and quality of life, each person is forced to be selfish and inward turning. While social pressures and ideas can contribute this process, I believe this is the main reason behind the conflict. We need each other to prosper for ourselves to prosper, however each individual will always desire to prosper just a little bit more, or a lot more, than their neighbors. So, what is the balance point where selfishness counter-balances the social obligation? Appiah had a good take on the idea of saving a child in a shallow pool, sitting on an airplane writing this has brought another example to mind: put your oxygen mask on first. An individual is less able to help those in need if their needs are met and, further, if their needs aren’t met to the point that they are performing at near optimum level. By performing at optimum level, each individual is more inclined to make informed decisions about proper resource management rather than reacting from the “obligation” gut. “Cosmopolitanism is about intelligence and curiosity as well as engagement” meaning that instead of simply saying disparities in the human race stem from poor resource management alone, which could be solved by sending all your belongings above the average global level to those with belongings below the average global level, that there are deeper root causes over holding “they are rich because we are poor” (168,172). As a cosmopolitan, that inherent selfishness need not to be in conflict with humanity, bring out the worst in letting the selfish instincts take destructively misuse society. Rather, being cosmopolitan-selfish aides to the community by being employed in an ethical work environment, using community resources such as parks and festivals, and sharing art in traveling exchanges if not actual trades. Being conflicted selfish can be seen in many examples in our society, the banking crisis, cash crop exploitation of farm land where food subsistence is not met, and the decrease of public education funding by tax payers who benefitted from the system originally.
By using examples stretching further and further back into human history, Appiah shows the impracticality and misguided ideas of cultural purism. Because we have no one culture, no one living situation, and “not all values have a single measure,” the uniformity advocated by counter-cosmopolitans can be a force which oppresses ideas under absolutes (166). There is no “disbelief” in cosmopolitanism, only values and ideas which can be revised in context of judgments which incorporate pluralism to the greatest extent without starting to condone unethical behavior, that which violates universal human ideals. Appiah finishes his conclusion by trying to define what we must take up to become cosmopolitans, “If we accept the cosmopolitan challenge, we will tell our representatives that we want them to remember those strangers” because “reason, principle, conscience, the inhabitant of the breast” (174, 174). We must find moderation in all things, our acceptance and judgments of other cultures, our obligations, and our ideal of the individual. We are not just “humans,” though that should be a corner stone of ourselves and our interactions, because we have differences, designations, priorities, opportunities, and lives. By doing research on HIV/AIDS, I found many of the problems lay not in a lack of funding or education but rather in the breakdown of the social network, the idea that the differences place people into a context were they “don’t matter very much” and thus places them at risk of disease, poverty, and isolation (153). Not all people can matter to us equally, but all people can matter to us to the point we feel obligation to bare responsibility for their well being in our society. Emphasizing these differences simply attempts to reduce our obligations and dehumanize those we do not know how to or are unwilling to aide. The very fact that we must work to dehumanize through stigma these people illustrates the strong universal connection within humanity.