Sunday, March 15, 2009
Friday, March 13, 2009
Arendt asks:
"How can anything relevant for the world we live in arise out of so resultless an enterprize[thinking]?" (p.167)
Could the answer be that thinking is relevant to the world because it results in engaged citizenship?
Are we not both thinker and actor as citizen? To be a citizen of a democracy, means to be engaged. And to be engaged means that it is our collective responsibility (as individuals) to think and especially question, always.
Collective responsibility is not something we do. It is the condition of who we are, politically. Citizenship IS collective responsibility.
"no moral, individual and personal, standards of conduct will ever be able to excuse us from collective responsibility(158). Says Arendt in her quizzical way. But it refers to, I believe, our status, our condition as citizens. We cannot escape it.
Perhaps, what Arendt means to stress is that regardless of our personal belief systems or line of thinking about who we are (the two in one), we can not escape citizenship. Within this context, even inaction would be a form of action, i.e., not voting has consequences equal to that of voting. Not participating rather than inconsequential, may actually mean more to one's community than one might think.
Arendt poses another puzzle in words, she says:
"Two conditions have to be present for collective responsibility: I must be held responsible for something I have not done, and the reason for my responsibility must be my membership in a group (a collective which no voluntary act of mine can dissolve, that is, a membership which is utterly unlike a business partnership which I can dissolve at will(149)."
Now go back and replace "collective responsibility" with "citizenship" and the puzzle appears to be solved. Where else does inaction matter as much as action?
This is how and why the term collective guilt can only be used metaphorically. It is not a literal proposition. I can not be held responsible for what I have not done, and yet I am always responsible for what I have not done within the context of my political group. In other words, I am always responsible to the "collective" as a citizen whether I choose to act or not.
As a citizen, I am always responsible for the banality of evil, especially when I refuse to think or act in a responsible way.
"It is better to suffer wrong than to do wrong"(153) takes on an entirely different meaning as we look at it within the framework of "Citizenship." I can suffer entirely alone as an individual, but to do wrong I necessarily and always involve others. A ripple effect, if you will, is always the result of my action within the larger political group.
When I committ a crime, I affect the whole negatively. When I am the victim, the perpetrator affects the whole negatively. Someone is always acting upon the whole in any overt action. But so too is someone affecting a democracy when one supposes they are doing nothing.
In my mind Arendt's emphasis lies in her admiration of Socrates and the freedoms of the United States. Democracy,and citizenship seem to me to be highly important to Arendt, personally, and influences her thinking. She is always reluctant, however to come right out, and influence ours. If we think for ourselves, however, we may very well come to the conclusion that being a Citizen, whether of a single country,or of the world, requires Responsibility and Judgement.
"How can anything relevant for the world we live in arise out of so resultless an enterprize[thinking]?" (p.167)
Could the answer be that thinking is relevant to the world because it results in engaged citizenship?
Are we not both thinker and actor as citizen? To be a citizen of a democracy, means to be engaged. And to be engaged means that it is our collective responsibility (as individuals) to think and especially question, always.
Collective responsibility is not something we do. It is the condition of who we are, politically. Citizenship IS collective responsibility.
"no moral, individual and personal, standards of conduct will ever be able to excuse us from collective responsibility(158). Says Arendt in her quizzical way. But it refers to, I believe, our status, our condition as citizens. We cannot escape it.
Perhaps, what Arendt means to stress is that regardless of our personal belief systems or line of thinking about who we are (the two in one), we can not escape citizenship. Within this context, even inaction would be a form of action, i.e., not voting has consequences equal to that of voting. Not participating rather than inconsequential, may actually mean more to one's community than one might think.
Arendt poses another puzzle in words, she says:
"Two conditions have to be present for collective responsibility: I must be held responsible for something I have not done, and the reason for my responsibility must be my membership in a group (a collective which no voluntary act of mine can dissolve, that is, a membership which is utterly unlike a business partnership which I can dissolve at will(149)."
Now go back and replace "collective responsibility" with "citizenship" and the puzzle appears to be solved. Where else does inaction matter as much as action?
This is how and why the term collective guilt can only be used metaphorically. It is not a literal proposition. I can not be held responsible for what I have not done, and yet I am always responsible for what I have not done within the context of my political group. In other words, I am always responsible to the "collective" as a citizen whether I choose to act or not.
As a citizen, I am always responsible for the banality of evil, especially when I refuse to think or act in a responsible way.
"It is better to suffer wrong than to do wrong"(153) takes on an entirely different meaning as we look at it within the framework of "Citizenship." I can suffer entirely alone as an individual, but to do wrong I necessarily and always involve others. A ripple effect, if you will, is always the result of my action within the larger political group.
When I committ a crime, I affect the whole negatively. When I am the victim, the perpetrator affects the whole negatively. Someone is always acting upon the whole in any overt action. But so too is someone affecting a democracy when one supposes they are doing nothing.
In my mind Arendt's emphasis lies in her admiration of Socrates and the freedoms of the United States. Democracy,and citizenship seem to me to be highly important to Arendt, personally, and influences her thinking. She is always reluctant, however to come right out, and influence ours. If we think for ourselves, however, we may very well come to the conclusion that being a Citizen, whether of a single country,or of the world, requires Responsibility and Judgement.
Saturday, February 28, 2009
More about Responsibility and Judgment
(I also added more info about Arendt's "phenomenological" approach as comment #25 under the post for last week)
"Responsibility and Judgment consists mainly of lectures on practical philosophy delivered in the 1960s, concentrating on the relationship between the world of public politics and that of personal morality. Arendt argued that the two worlds had a lot in common, in that neither political issues nor moral ones could ever be settled definitively, or by the mechanical application of ready-made categories: The truths of morality and politics were to be brought into being by a process of deliberation rather than discovered by acts of reasoning or observation. Moral and political dilemmas were like artistic ones; they both called for what Kant called "judgment," or the kind of infinite thoughtfulness that is willing to expose its own standards of assessment to the challenge of the issues it encounters. On the other hand, there was also a fundamental difference in that moral judgments are concerned with the self, or the kind of person one wishes to be, whereas political judgments are concerned with the world, and the kind of society one wants to live in. Having established an analytical distinction between public and private life, Arendt went on to warn of the dangers of blurring it in social action."(http://hannaharendt.net/reports/whateverII.html)
Friday, February 20, 2009
Arendt's Responsibility and Judgment--kick off discussion
(extra credit for the student who adds the next prompt after everyone has tackled this)
Arendt writes, "There exists in our society a widespread fear of judging . . . behind the unwillingness to judge lurks the suspicion that no one is a free agent, and hence the doubt that anyone is responsible or could be expected to answer for what he has done" (19).
Can you connect this point to past readings (I am thinking in particular of Kaufmann but you may think of other authors) to help us understand Arendt's concept of judgement and then also unpack this idea further with other points that she makes? What is the connection between our ability to judge and the modern liberal notion that we are all moral agents who can (and must) cultivate the internal authority to know the difference between right and wrong? How does she elaborate on and support this argument?
Thursday, February 19, 2009
Altruism is real. Dr. Paul Farmer is an inspiring man. He came from humble beginings, but the one thing he did say about his childhood was that he was "surrounded by affection". This makes all the difference, when you have got love around you it opens up the world a million possibilities. When you are given Love you learn how to give it back. Altruism is Love.
Sunday, February 15, 2009
Wednesday, February 4, 2009
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Re: John Wallace's Article "Making Philosophy Useful"
This idea of "Play" intriques me. The subject of Philosophy has always seemed so lofty and all about thinking. The idea of "doing" philosophy is difficult to get my head around. But the idea of give-and-take is appealing. Learning from one's experiment with philosophical concepts in a "playful" way makes it seem lighter and more manageable. To affect change in a playful way, to me, means to give more of oneself and not be so guarded. PLAY IS a philosophy. Does anyone agree? Disagree? And how playful can one be without drifting over the line of foolish or obnoxious?