Friday, February 20, 2009

Arendt's Responsibility and Judgment--kick off discussion

(extra credit for the student who adds the next prompt after everyone has tackled this)

Arendt writes,
"There exists in our society a widespread fear of judging . . . behind the unwillingness to judge lurks the suspicion that no one is a free agent, and hence the doubt that anyone is responsible or could be expected to answer for what he has done" (19).
Can you connect this point to past readings (I am thinking in particular of Kaufmann but you may think of other authors) to help us understand Arendt's concept of judgement and then also unpack this idea further with other points that she makes? What is the connection between our ability to judge and the modern liberal notion that we are all moral agents who can (and must) cultivate the internal authority to know the difference between right and wrong? How does she elaborate on and support this argument?

25 comments:

  1. From Steve who was having trouble getting this box:
    Arendt's issue with the response to her writings on the Eichmann trial, which she is addressing here, is the abdication of personal judgment as justification for supporting an immoral system. Eichmann and his defenders say he wasn't a free agent, "if I had not done it, somebody else could and would have" – Arendt's "cog-theory" (pg. 29). I think this relates to Barzun's observation that bureaucracies manifest the mechanical – "machines are admirable and tyrannize only with the user's consent, absentmindedness, or laziness" ("Toward a Fateful Serenity" pg. 4). Arendt would likely agree with Barzun. She states that, "every organization demands obedience"(pg 46), and equates obedience to support.

    Obedience led to the "total moral collapse of respectable society during the Hitler regime." Arendt asserts that those who didn't "exchange one system of values for another," (pg.44) were the only people didn't participate in the Hitler regime. These "non-participants" didn't function in "an automatic way." They questioned what actions they could live with and judged for themselves.
    I worry that our societies are still at risk to repeat elements of what was seen in Hitler's regime. We're seeing genocide and ethnic conflicts in Africa and Sri Lanka. We've seen the U.S. government use "acts of state" (pg. 37) to expedite its programs. And we have a large population that "hold fast to moral norms and standards" (pg 45), which Arendt says, "can be changed overnight."

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  2. I'm not sure how much if at all this relates to Steve's response...however...
    I feel like Arendt has linked a relationship between judgement and guilt. This would be more a self judgement when It comes to one feeling guilty or a collective judgement of individuals when referring to a group of people, or collective guilt. Arendt refers to guilt as being metaphorical if "we say we feel guilty for the sins of our fathers or people or of mankind, in short for deeds we have not done"(p.28). I mean it does seem kinda silly to take on guilt for something that you personally took no actual part in. Again she throws out the ineffectiveness of the concept of a collective guilt by saying,"where all are guilty, no one is"(p.28). If the innocent feel bad for what the guilty did, than there is no true fault.
    While Kaufman doesn't really use the word guilt he talks about peoples fear and negative views and feelings on judging others. He states that judgement "may be prompted by envy, resentment, and hatred" therefore people become timid about doing so. He refers to this fear people have as making them meek. For some reason this reminded me of the collective guilt Arendt was talking about that many Germans after WWII felt. She talks about how many of the Germans who had taken no part in the holocaust have this collective guilt for something they hadn't done. It made me think of them as being meek. The fact that they would judge themselves and take blame when they could be viewing their ancestors, relatives or fellow men as having made a wrong choice and learning from it but then moving on. Do you think Ardent would agree with Kaufman about the idea of not judging others out of fear as a sign of meekness? Would Kaufman refer to peoples meekness of judging others as contributing to their personal guilt?

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  3. Thank you Steve and Nichole for making coherent sense in commenting on Arendt. To me it is an enormous task, as I find her to be an extremely difficult read. I will attempt to add to the dialog.

    In our reading Toward a Faithful Serenity, by Jacques Barzun, he makes the statement, “When sufficiently general, the habit of grabbing, cheating, and evading reciprocity is the best way to degrade a civilization, and perhaps bring about its collapse.” More than any form of action, I think it is the habituation of moral judgment Arendt opposes. The reference to the cultivation of the authority to know the difference between right and wrong, may simply be a cry to stay conscious and in the moment, for lack of better words. To deal with the facts and cease to look to history, politics or any formulation of philosophical analogy for our judgment seems an appropriate approach to the modern day evil Arendt was witness. This approach, as I understand it, would amount to no less than personal responsibility.

    But where does one derive personal responsibility? In referring to Kant, Arendt says, “And if someone had asked Kant where this knowledge [our ability to determine good from bad] exists, he would have replied in the rational structure of the human mind, whereas, of course others had located the same knowledge in the human heart” (pg. 62). It seems that the various takes on morality are relative to history, circumstance and arena of thought in which they were birthed. Arendt, to me, seems to advocate that judgment may be relative to the individual and ultimately dependent for its efficiency (and justice, if you will) on our efforts to stay awake and think.

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  4. I found the idea of judgement exposed by Arendt aligned with the case of the Italian Lorenzo, told by Primo Levy in Kauffmann's text: Lorenzo did good for six months based on his judgement. So, judgement ultimately is the "clarification", the reasoning that leads men to choose a good or a bad direction. Arendt's idea that there was something wrong with the man (Eichmann) that didn't judge good from bad correctly, therefore doing such terrible deeds, is reinforced by the choice of Lorenzo to do good. The opposition estabilished the idea.
    I consider then that the judgement can also be said to be an extension of the humanism level one possess. Socrates believed that judging would come out of reasoning and so does Arendt. Really? I would have liked to ask her about her ideas of the (mis)judgement of Heidegger, who took the side of the Nazis.
    So, being educated men (both Heidegger and Eichmann), thefore using reason to judge good and bad, they are to be responsible for their acts. Reasoning presuppose responsibility. Reasoning also could bring guilt, but it is not possiblre, in my opinion, in Eichmann case: innocent others cannot carry guilty for such horrible acts. And many other horrible acts as well. Judging (the way Arendt proposes judgement) in such cases may also be a decision between life and death. (Back to Heidegger, she didn't do what she preached: she left him to save her life, not really judging him.)
    Also the collective guilt can't be exclusively brought by responsibility or judgement, but also by remorse or shame. The judgement (or lack of it) may also turn in unpredictable directions in "emergency" times, as put by her, maybe in an attempt to clean Heidegger's acts.
    But in any direction one looks, Arednt never disconnect thinking from judging, even when she is controversial.

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  5. Interesting sidenote in response to Vaeria's comment--Arendt had a fairly intense affair with Heidegger. A few years ago someone wrote a play about it. In light of her views and that he did work with/for the Nazi's--there certainly are some interesting questions embedded in that relationship. Love is a strange thing--like everything worthwhile, full of contradictions. Here is a little more about this relationship:
    "Arendt and Heidegger met in 1924 at the University of Marburg, when Arendt, an eighteen-year-old German Jew, became a student of Heidegger, a thirty-five-year-old married man. They were lovers for about four years; separated for almost twenty years, during which time Heidegger became a Nazi and Arendt emigrated to the United States and involved herself with issues of political theory and philosophy; resumed their relationship in 1950 and in spite of its complexities remained close friends until Arendt's death in 1975. Ettinger provides engrossing details of this strange and tormented relationship. She shows how Heidegger used Arendt but also influenced her thought, how Arendt struggled to forgive Heidegger for his prominent involvement with the Nazis, and how Heidegger's love for Arendt and fascination with Nazism can be linked to his romantic predisposition."
    http://yalepress.yale.edu/yupbooks/book.asp?isbn=9780300064070

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  6. What happens to societies and citizens when the "lesser evil" is accepted? QUOTE: "Acceptance of lesser evils is consciously used in conditioning the government officials as well as the population at large to the acceptance of evil as such.". (p.36). Arendt defines how the extermination of the Jews was preceded by a gradual sequence of anti-Jewish measures -- setting up a bureaucracy of sorts in which refusal to cooperate would make things worse. ANOTHER QUOTE: "bureaucracy unhappily is the rule of nobody and for this very reason perhaps the least human and most cruel form of rulership." (p 31). QUESTION: Does lessor evil exist? Do lessor evils combine to create the ultimate evil? Is it possible to accept Hitler's final solution as a means to get his war, but not in and of itself a political policy he imposed on Germany?

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  7. In the New York times today there was an article noting that many states are re-examining their death penalty statutes because of cost.
    Here is an example of government making a moral decision. What I find interesting about this issue in the context of "evil" is that judgment of something/someone evil (death row inmate) can be manipulated and changed at will. QUOTE: "the total moral collapse of society during the Hitler regime may teach us that under such circumstances those who cherish values and hold fast to moral norms and standards are not reliable: we now know that moral norms and standards can be changed overnight, and that all that then will be left is the mere habit of holding fast to something." (p 45).

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  8. Interesting discussion from all of you so far. I think that Heidi's note about the death penalty is interesting in light of our discussion about intention last week--if legal statutes such as the death penalty are changed for financial reasons, is this a collective moral act? Anyway, I don't want to get you all off on a tangent!
    I really appreciate the way you are all using quotes from the book to help you unpack these ideas. That is exactly the way to get at these ideas.
    Lesser evils--I think in next week's reading Arendt will make the point that when choosing the "lesser" evil it is important not to forget that it is still an evil!

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  9. In one of my academic classes yesterday, my teacher yelled and cursed at a student because she was laughing. The teacher then went on to say the student has personal issues and problems if they are always laughing.....basically judging this student when she has no idea what is going on. In actuality, this student is from a large Texan family, full of joy, laughter, and loud remarks, so her laughter is only a mark of who she is and where she has come from. Are we judging people, and ourselves everyday? Will we ever not judge? Everyone comes from a different and diverse background therefore we have no idea what has occurred in their past. When we don't acknowledge this, we are only setting up society to be one big lie, as well as a means for destruction. Arendt goes on to say, "How can you judge without holding on to preconceived standards, norms, and general rules under which the particular cases and instances can be subsumed?" (Arendt, 26)Kaufman speaks about negative views, and I wonder how far judging can go in the negative skeem of things. We are constantly looking for acceptance and meaning, so where does the negative judgment come from and how much does this effect our day to day lives?

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  10. In “Personal Responsibility Under Dictatorship”, Arendt is, at the least, taken aback by how swiftly people accept the easy morality of ideas like “collective guilt” and “cog-theory”. And more importantly how completely unexamined most people’s morality is.
    In Arendt’s formative years it was assumed that “moral conduct [was] a matter of course,” (pg. 22) among Germans of the era. Yet, during the Nazi ascension there had been an “almost universal breakdown, not of personal responsibility, but of personal judgment.” (pg. 24) “Lifelong friendships were broken and discarded,” yet “the new regime posed … nothing more than a very complex political problem.” If Nazi policy was merely an intellectual problem, no one thought about the moral implications.
    The critics of Arendt’s "Eichmann in Jerusalem: A Report on the Banality of Evil" assert that it is wrong to pass judgment on Eichmann. They present ideas like “you had to be there,” cog-theory,” and “collective guilt.” Arendt says those arguments “would be ruled out as immaterial” in a court of law. Relative moral stances vs. rationally examined, and consistent, morals are at the heart of Arendt’s question of who is “qualified to discuss such matters.” (pg. 26)

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  11. I need to respond to Heidi’s remarks and then I will post with citations.

    This is a bit outside our discussion, but since Arendt implores us to look at the facts in making a judgment I have to respond:
    While its true the actions of the Nazis and SS fall outside of normal historical or moral behavior, there are psychological and other factors as well which Arendt does not seem to address. There is also growing evidence that at least Hitler was regularly under the influence of amphetamines. It was a really ugly scene. Where drugs are concerned, lets just face it… Morality pales. Rules of conduct can be so perverted without reason other than the drug itself. Judgment is rendered futile in such cases. Try making sense of the addicts behavior. We are not talking about normal healthy people making bad decisions. Hilter and many of the thugs he ran with during his beer-bar days were very likely clinical sociopaths. The answer to why even the judicial system could not address the madness unleashed under a sociopathic drug addict in a satisfactory manner is actually logical and does makes sense if you really think about it.

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  12. Arendt asks, "what happens to the human faculty of judgment when it is faced with ocurrences that spell the breakdown of all customary standards and hence are unprecedented in the sense that they are not foreseen in the general rules(p.26-27)?

    My answer might be to punish the crime and look past the criminal.

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  13. Ardent proposes the idea that some people may choose their morals basesed on the long term damage it could potentially do to themselves. There is this "dispostion to live together explicity with oneself" which is why we are constantly talking and reasoning with ourselves, also refered to by Socrates and Plato as thinking(p.45). While people could tell us what is right and wrong over and over again, what it comes down to for most is people asking themsleves how acting a certain way or performing a certain deed will make them feel long after it has happened. Ardent proposes that, "they [ask] themselves to what extent they would be able to live in peace with themselves after having commited certain deeds" (p.44). This seems to a a huge part of what went into the Holocast and how certain people chose to die rather than participate since they knew they would not have been able to "live together with a murderer-themselves" (p.44). Ardent kinda puts people into three categories when it comes to making moral decisions, the ones who charish and hold fast to their own personal ones, the skeptics and people who doubt and then the ones who realize no matter what we have to live with ourselves.

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  14. Great dialogue here. Without looking at my book--I think that Arendt is saying that we have to judge an individual who has committed crimes against other individuals. Steve's last comment speaks to this--following orders does not relieve one of not using one's inner moral authority. Arendt's point is that our willingness to turn responsibility over to those "in charge" on a political level (or any level) is a dangerous stance and we give up really what makes us human--our capacity to think for ourselves. Nichole's comment above is very significant. Arendt is stating that, perhaps, the criteria used by those who chose to say, No, who resisted their "cogness"is not some universal maxim about doing good, not harm, but more personal--what can I do and not do and still live "together" with myself? In a sense, this could be seen as a kind of self-protectiveness or "selfish" motive (to go back to last week's discussion). But if we think of the preservation of the self as being bigger than that of the physical/material self, but of our ego-ideal, of our principles, of our humanity--then preserving that self may be at the risk of sacrificing everything else. Many chose to die, rather than follow commands. So, can we not judge those who did--who chose not to think for themselves? I don't know, as we can still have sympathy for the duress that person was under--but, where does it stop if we lose the ability to think for ourselves? If the threshold for what we can do and still "live with ourselves" becomes as high as Eichmann's? These ideas will continue to be important also when we read Whistleblowers and Alford's take on what motivates a whistleblower to stand up to authority.

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  15. I think that the most important aspect of judging others is to first look within and judge your own self. If you are not ready to come to grasp with your own morals, you do not have the right to judge others. As we are all agents of society’s ability to have a moral code, we need to make sure that the direction society is heading in is a just one. In my eyes, people who do not stand up for their beliefs and just follow others tend to be sheep. We are a society that needs to stand up for our beliefs and be lead by people who are not afraid to be wolves.

    In regard to the beginning quote, there has to be a time where you do stand up for your beliefs. Although there may be a “widespread fear of judging” as a whole, those that are able to take responsibility for their own actions and speak freely about their beliefs will have a lighter conscience and can help direct society through the cloudy issues of right and wrong. Posted by Charlie Raven.

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  16. I have to agree with Christine, I also found Arendt very difficult to read. She posed many questions about responsibility, judgment and guilt that I have not thought about prior to the reading, I felt as though I was spinning when I was done with her reading. On that note I do feel like I gained some good understanding on what she was teaching from reading many of your comments/blogs. Which I might add are very well done and insightful by everyone.
    So with that said I will attempted to add my two cents to this discussion.
    In regards to the discussion about feeling guilty for doing an evil act because you are expected or demanded to do so by law is a conundrum that many American men faced during the Vietnam War.On page 35 Arendt states that "personal or moral issues,as distinct from legal accountability, hardly arises with those who were convinced adherents of the regime:" This is true in the context of the Nazi regime. Yet does this also apply to a situations such as an American who skipped out on the Vietnam war because he feels it is morally incorrect. Should this person be viewed as a pioneer, a hero of moral correctness. Or conversely should they be viewed as someone who is not willing to be responsible for their own legal accountability, like many of their own peers are doing. This is a little off subject from the Nazi regime, but I found it an interesting question because I recently had this discussion with my dad who was drafted. The question I asked him was if he skipped out on the draft would he feel guilty because he technically broke the law or would he feel as though he made the right decision because morally he did what he thought was the right thing to do for the sake of humanity.

    At the time he was drafted he felt as though he owed it to America, despite our government making a bad decision. Even though he felt the war was wrong he felt more morally obliged to take the legal route and go to Vietnam. I wonder if it was do to the pressure and propaganda from the government at that time to make him feel that way. I am also wondering if that same pressure and propaganda made soldiers of the Nazi regime forget about what their morals really were, although they should absolutely be held responsible because if they were involved their hands are bloody, but I also believe that desperate people are easily manipulated and Hitler was a master manipulate of his followers.

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  17. levels of the Third Reich. And IF we take these events out of the "morality" arena, we have to come to the agreement that no rules apply except those of the judicial system. We must then look at the acts themselves. Murder, mass murder, conspiracy to commit murder,

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  18. My previous post malfunctioned...

    Thinking for myself…
    I have to say that I was most enlightened by Steve's first comments. I get it. I see the point. Arendt wants us to think for ourselves and not give way to prescribed moral formulations. However, I honestly believe that the sane are ill-equipted to judge the morality of the insane. I mean this literally. In the case of Hitler and Eichmann, there are no standards by which to judge the nature of their characters accept to acknowledge what now becomes the historical documentation of various forms of drug indulgence by all levels of the Third Reich. And IF we take these events out of the "morality" arena, we have to come to the agreement that no rules apply except those of the judicial system. We must then look at the acts themselves. Murder, mass murder, conspiracy to commit murder, torture, and a multitude of other crimes are all punishable under the law (although I am not a student of international law of that time, I think the point can still be made.) I am not being flippant when I say punish the crime. And in doing so, we can see clearly which motives and activities are abhorrent to rational human beings and society at large. We then must vow to stay alert to these types of crimes and their precursors. I find it entirely illogical to attempt to come to terms with the morality in such a case. Eichmann was co-conspirator. The heinous nature of his crimes is regrettable to all human kind, but they are mere crimes none the less.

    It is the scale and intensity, the voracity with which these crimes were committed which tempts us to question even our own morality and judgment. I say once again, murder, torture and conspiracy are all punishable by death. Perhaps death does not seem adequate, but it is the ultimate punishment we can offer and it is the appropriate punishment and resolution for these crimes. I do not quote Arendt here, because I find her entire line of questioning (actually, but respectfully) frustrating and impractical.

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  19. I do believe that desperate people do desperate acts, one's that they would not normally do under such great pressure or under the influence of a manipulating mastermind such as Hitler, but these are the week people, the strong ones to not let temptation take over their beliefs. People only tend to see the choices that are laid out in front of them and do not often think out of the box to create another choice or alternative of their own.
    In the quote on page 18 it states, "It is impossible to withstand temptation of any kind, that none of us could be trusted or even expect to be trustworthy when the chips are down, that to be tempted and to be forced are almost the same..."
    I do not feel temptation is to be forced. Socrates states, that it is better to suffer than to do wrong, but Arendt disagrees that this philosophy is practiced by the norm, but that the opposite is more commonly acted upon by individuals. I do not know which is more commonly practiced, but I would like to believe that Socrates's belief is more common than not. I disagree that it is better to do wrong than to suffer. Even when placed in the worst position, to choose your own life over your beliefs, people still have the choice to make a decision based on their morals and I feel there are still many people who would choose to do the right thing, according to proper ethics and morals, than to give in to temptation.
    During the Columbine attack, a young girl was placed in this situation when a boy with a gun aimed it at her head asked her if she believed in God. She new that if she said yes he would probably pull the trigger and kill her, but instead of taking the easy way out, she stood by her beliefs and looked right into the barrel of the gun pointed at her face and replied with, "Yes!"

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  20. “There exists in our society a widespread fear of judging… (19)” Just with the first sentence of the prompt there exits’ a connection with Kaufmann. For example, “How are we to live? By what standards should we judge ourselves? For what virtues should we strive? Speaking of nobility, a quest for honesty, and the originality of the Old Testament, while criticizing organized religion and theology and fallacies about commitment does not settle these urgent questions (72)”. There is a fear of judging because when you take ones inventory you therefore are left open to tu quoque; you too. If judgment is passed on somebody else, and this is so apparent at Mayflower Center, but there it is called “holding someone accountable.” This is just a hypothetical due to anonymity, but could happen anyway – say a client is goes to a store and buys a cable for the television so he can watch TV (they can only watch movies on Saturdays, so there is a TV, with cable, just no jack to hook it up) when he isn’t supposed to. The reasoning is this, if you can not follow the protocol set forth by the clinical team then how in the world are you expected to stay sober one day at time while not in the structured environment of treatment. Here is where it gets tricky and I see people being fearful of judging. Client
    B comes downstairs and see’s Client A rigging the TV when there is no TV watching. It is Client B’s responsibility, according to Mayflower Center LLC, to hold him accountable. This situation is so common, I mean I have been there before, and you have that internal dialogue; “should I rat, but it’s not ratting, and if don’t I won’t stay sober because it is addict behavior to not follow directions.”
    Client B the next morning in group says; “Client A you know, I am worried about the program of recovery that you are working because you know that you are not supposed to watch TV, but you did, and when you do disregard the seriousness of our disease it makes me sad and worried.”
    Keep in mind, nobody is perfect, especially those who may work the best programs of recovery, like Client B. The “dirt" is, so to speak on all them.
    Client A then says to B; “you know, I wasn’t going to bring this up, but if you are worried about my program then you should worry about your own inventory because did I not see you sneak outside last week to meet that 17 year old you met at AA for some late night head. You know that you should refrain from sexual contact in the first year of sobriety, but you didn’t. Needless to say, I am more worried about you.”
    This is classic in treatment. I mean this happens all the time. I have witnessed people in sheer terror when faced with judging a peer because of what they might have on them.
    “Behind the unwillingness to judge lurks the suspicion that no one is a free agent, and hence the doubt that anyone is responsible or could be expected to answer for what he has done (19).” The example I mentioned of the hypothetical clients at Mayflower is in my opinion a great example of a person not being answer for what he has done. Client B would have looked much better if he had owned his actions, asked for help with the behavior, and then expressed his worry for Client A.

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  21. Christine, could you please expand your argument that amphetamines impeded Hitler's Morality? To me, using the Excuse of Drugs is a cheap accusation that only scratches the surface of human evil and banality. Labeling Hitler as merely a drug-user is trying to simple rationalize a behavior that cannot be simply rationalized. Whether Hitler and his beer-hall palls were normal or sociopaths or drug-addled fiends is not the issue; why did a country blindly and sheepishly follow a leader extolling the "virtues" of genocide and racial purity? How could a whole country relinquish its Humanity, its Morality, its Human-ocity? Hitler’s rise to power did not happen in a vacuum. The country did not wake up one day and collectively decide; “let’s make Hitler Chancellor!” His ascent was methodical, planned and sustained. And once in power, he was able to consolidate and unify his power base by completely eliminating the opposition. This, to me, proves insane or not, he was intelligent enough to understand the consequences of his actions, understood how to appeal to people’s nature and lead them down an evil path. This is not the mind of a drugged-out insane beast. This is the mind of someone who has consciously tossed human Morality aside for other aspirations. Ultimately, I do agree with you about punishment and death, but differ on the judgment. Hitler’s crimes are still rooted in our Humane and Moral and Sane world no matter how staggeringly evil they may be.

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  22. I am going to respond to Christine's thoughts on the death penalty first--
    I agree that we must focus on the crime its self rather than the reason that the crime was committed, or whether the person is sane or insane. But how can we justify and moralize putting someone to death as a punishment of murder? Who makes the judgement as to whether one is sane or insane? If we are focussing on the crime, killing someone, doesn't that make us criminals for using the death penalty? Doesn't putting someone to death as a punishment strip us of the authority we previously had? If people are in positions of the authority because they are deemed 'moral' people, how can they keep that title if they also murder people?
    Just a thought, I do see the opposing point though. I completely agree with what you said about looking at the acts themselves.

    Next, I am aligned with the idea of being our own moral agents, rather than merely accepting what our leaders say or following legality. I agree with everyone in saying that Arendt was a little bit hard to follow(but interesting!) so I hope i've interpreted this concept correctly. We must question legal issues in terms of morality, because if we don't they will never grow and expand. The example I see in terms of being a "free agent" is being a therapist. For example, therapists are under a legal and ethical law of confidentiality. This is an understanding between the therapist and the client. However, if the therapist becomes aware of a seriously dangerous situation, they may break confidentiality. Now a days, this practice has been implemented into the law. But in earlier years, therapists had to risk their certification by putting their moralities before the law and break confidentiality to save a person or rid them of a dangerous situation. Thus, i do think we are our own moral agents in terms of the law/our community.

    However, things such as guilt and fear may define our judgements at times. Are we born with emotions such as guilt and fear or are they learned? I think that they are a part of the human condition. If these things are invested in us, it almost negates the concept of being "free agents." Oftentimes our emotions, most commonly fear, manifest themselves and prevent us from achievements."There exists in our society a widespread fear of judging . . . behind the unwillingness to judge lurks the suspicion that no one is a free agent, and hence the doubt that anyone is responsible or could be expected to answer for what he has done" (19). So we are free agents individually, but we are not free agents because our internal world controls us.

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  23. I meant to attach this quote to my previous comment:
    "personal or moral issues, as distinct from legal accountability, hardly arises with those who were convinced adherents of the regime" (p.35)

    "the total moral collapse of society during the Hitler regime may teach us that under such circumstances those who cherish values and hold fast to moral norms and standards are not reliable: we now know that moral norms and standards can be changed overnight, and that all that then will be left is the mere habit of holding fast to something." (p 45)

    This further proves my point of morals being infinitely changing. Things change daily, new situations erupt. Are we always going to swear by the morals we live by today? This shows me that morals are driven by feelings. If they can change so quickly, they must be in some way linked to how we feel about situations. I feel that intuition also determines our morals. We get "feelings' about what the right thing to do is.

    The only thing constant is infinite change. Thus, I agree, we should not hold fast to anything.

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  24. Thanks everyone for your thoughtful consideration of my remarks in class. It was my failing in both confidence and communication not to say that I “disagreed” with Arendt, rather than I “didn’t understand her.” I do understand her argument and I wasn’t “ganging” up against her, but merely engaging in an intellectual argument with her. In so doing, I was seeking clarification not so much on what she was saying but as to my own rather pragmatic understanding of the issue.

    With all of the questioning, and in Arendt’s case, intense questioning on issues such as individual responsibility and judgment, she stirred in me a pronounced need to go against the grain; to think around her proposals and to come to my “own” conclusions regardless of how hackneyed the result ultimately may have been. I was also prompted by the recounting of the horrors in Germany to be perhaps inappropriately “passionate” about the topic: "... overcharged with emotions, often of a not very high caliber..."(p56)

    Let it be known that none of your comments in class or in our class Blog have been wasted on me, for it has always been my intent to leave my college experience as a changed person. You have all contributed to my growth. What kind hearts, to allow me to indulge my truth seeking. I promise I will apply restraint in upcoming classes. I am not so self absorbed as it may have seemed. My favorite adage "Its not all about me."

    Finally, in examining the matter for the last time, I think that my penchant for the practical overtook my argument in the end. Having worked in the legal field, I no doubt have come to admire the law for its over all efficiency. As a pragmatist (which may in this context be a dirty word), I sought to find a real world method to tackle the issue. Since I have rather cynically suspected for many years now, man/human beings cannot always be counted on to “stay awake and think” I did resort to seeking external forces to remedy the matter. And the point is well taken that following the law of the day was a major component in the banality of that evil. This caused frustration in some I’m sure, as it was off point. I was trying to “help” I now realize in rendering a verdict. I was in fact trying in my historical context to take on the responsibility of "fixing" these unresolved devastations and lay them to rest once and for all. This is what Arendt would call taking on “political” vs.“personal” responsibility,” And as she so aptly puts it “Whoever takes upon himself political responsibility will always come to the point where he says with Hamlet: The time is out of joint: O cursed spite – That ever I was born to set it right! (p.28). And let’s just face it, I ain’t no Hamlet!

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  25. Well, I certainly don’t think that pragmatism is a bad word (or deed). Let me give you a little more background on Arendt’s approach/philosophical perspective
    Arendt’s work can be understood as a type of phenomenology, “the study of ‘phenomena’: appearances of things, or things as they appear in our experience, or the ways we experience things, thus the meanings things have in our experience. (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy).
    I realize that I am very much more interested in this approach than one that engages in analyzing abstract ideas. I am drawn to philosophers who are grappling with “what is” more than with ideas that may never actually be manifest in our lives (or if they were the connection with the abstraction may be unidentifiable).
    So, Arendt is looking at the phenomenon of the Holocaust and trying to understand the conditions that allowed the unraveling of this travesty and the larger implications thereof. She didn’t want to say—“It’s finished, we can go back to our lives now. A bad thing happened but now we move on.”
    We can well understand why many would want to do this. Many survivors were also never able to talk about what happened and there were many that secretly suffered survivor’s guilt that ruined the rest of their lives. I have been personally impacted by this “phenomenon” through my own family. I don’t talk about this often because I feel like a victim vulture—Germans still experience residue of collective guilt and I know Jews who seem to derive some sort of vicarious identity and self-righteousness from the suffering of Jews during the Holocaust. At the risk of being very controversial, I can say that I am deeply troubled by the ways in which the persecuted have become the persecutors in Israel and I think this can be linked in some ways to this collective (self)-righteousness for having suffered punishment for the mere crime of being Jewish. As a Jew, I have long been deeply troubled by this mentality at the same time that I respect the way in which the Germans have not allowed themselves to forget—a German friend of mine took 4 years of history about the Holocaust in high school. Can you imagine if we did the same here for our history with the Native Americans or slavery?
    Okay, back to Arendt. Here is a little more about her, which you may find interesting and informative: Arendt was interested in the species of phenomenology that is characterized as having to do with the public space. “She regards philosophy as born out of the experienced discrepancy between this ‘world of appearances’ in which we live and the medium of words which support ‘thinking’ . . .understanding the world of appearances means an attempt to uncover the nature of the human living ‘in the midst of the world’ . . .Arendt was also aware of how this public space is manipulated by governments, by commercial advertising, by ‘spin doctors’, and in general ‘by speech that does not disclose what is but sweeps it under the carpet. . .Arendt’s strong commitment to public life in the plurality, the requirement to listen attentively to the discord of many voices, meant that, for her genuine thinking required a public space, and needed to be carried out under public scrutiny and sustained by public participation, and this meant for her the practice of a kind of intellectual journalism” (Dermot Moran ,Introduction to Phenomenology, 287-89).

    So, here we are in the public space of our classroom doing this work. I think it is crucial that the intellectual work of philosophers is happening in the public square not just in esoteric academic circles, and I admire Arendt for being engaged in this way. Christine, I think you were channeling a bit of Arendt by offering your perspective and you helped to create a fiery and productive dialogue.
    I do think that we all need to be aware of leaving space for the quieter voices in the room and as it is not always easy to do so, I hope that everyone will take advantage of this blog as it allows us to share in everyone’s thinking! But discussion facilitators (and I!) need to be conscious of making space for everyone’s voice. Not easy, but we will get there, I’m sure—the semester is still young.

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